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PETITION FOR REHEARING
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure,

the

appellee-landowners

herewith

respectfully

petition this Court to rehear and reconsider its Opinion
issued in the case on November 20, 1990.x

That Opinion

reverses the interlocutory order of the District Court not on
the merits of the adjudicated facts, but on the singular basis
that the landowners, by withdrawing the monies deposited by
the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") with the Court
Clerk incident to its gaining immediate occupancy of the
landowners' premises, had waived

their right to urge a

valuation date in the Just Compensation phase of the case
different taan the statutorily presumed date of service of
summons.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The effect of the Courtfs Opinion is manifold and
profound. Without analysis, it reads into the Eminent Domain
occupancy statite, Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9, an unsupported
meaning of the phrase "abandonment of all defenses" never
intended and one that is at material odds with the structural
setting of condemnation Hdefenses" in the Eminent Domain Code.
Further to that end, the Opinion makes the constitutionally
ordained Just Compensation phase of the case potentially turn
upon a narrow and rigid construction of the immediate occupancy statute, contrary to the public policy of eminent domain
and the holding of this Court in Utah State Road Comm. v.

1

Associate counsel for Appellees enters an appearance at this stage of the
appeal because of potential implications in the Court Opinion on waiver.

Frlberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984).

As to the "waiver" of the

right to urge a different and earlier valuation date, the
Opinion is inconsistent with the elements of the waiver
doctrine under the well established precedent of this Court.
Lastly, the Court Opinion is unjust and harsh in its
application and creates a substantial paradox for lawyers and
their clients in eminent domain litigation.
ISSUE OF LAW ON REHEARING
Appellees are not insensitive to the fact that petitions
for rehearing are not generally favored and should not be used
to present either a new theory of the case or to simply
reproduce an already thoroughly developed argument.

The

Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 6 7 8, 681 (Utah 1982);
Kirchgestner v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 118
Utah 37, 225 P.2d 754, 755 (1950).

The fact is, however, that

in this appeal, the question of whether

the appellees'

acceptance of immediate occupancy funds deposited by UDOT
constituted a statutory waiver of the right to urge a different valuation date in the Just Compensation phase of the case,
was a relatively obscure issue until the Court Opinion.
UDOT's argument was far from comprehensive on waiver, occupying barely 2 pages as Point IV of its opening brief.

The

appellees responded in scant fashion with less than 3 pages in
Point IV of their answering brief.

Thus, a thorough, analyti-

cal legal argument on waiver un ,er the immediate occupancy
statute simply was not presented to the Court.

2

Yet the Court treated the waiver issue as the only
question in the case, never reaching, much less mentioning,
the extraordinary and penetrating factual analysis on the
merits of the case which formed the basis of the District
Court's holding.

Accordingly, appellees respectfully submit

that the Court erred by concluding in the Opinion that:
We hold that appellees waived their right
to challenge the dates of valuation when
they withdrew the funds deposited by UDOT
without taking some affirmative action to
preserve their challenge.
*

*

*

Since the property owners in this instance withdrew the funds without reserving any objection by stipulation or otherwise, they waived the right to challenge the date of valuation.
Slip Op. at 3, 5 (Attachment 1).
The Slip Opinion is annexed hereto as Attachment 1.

This

Court, under the circumstances, should rehear and reconsider
its decision, and conclude that by drawing down the immediate
occupancy funds the appellees did not waive their right to
urge a different valuation date in determining Just Compensation.
A R G U M E N T
POINT I .

THE STRUCTURE AND POLICY OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN
CODE AND OF SECTION 78-34-9, AS A PART THEREOF,
MANIFESTS THAT THE "DEFENSES" SUBJECT TO WAIVER
UPON WITHDRAWAL OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY FUNDS,
RELATE ONLY TO ISSUES INVOLVING THE
GOVERNMENT'S ENTITLEMENT TO CONDEMN.
The District Court

in this case, after a thorough

evidentiary hearing, concluded that although UDOT brought

3

actions to condemn the appellees1 properties in August 1986
and October 1987, by reason of UDOT's actions in 1977 and
thereafter, the properties were frozen and sterilized in the
market as of June 1977.

The trial court further determined

that a vacuous market for the properties existed thereafter
within which UDOT ultimately filed its condemnation actions in
1986 and 1987. The District Court found as ultimate fact and
law that the evidence was sufficient under the teachings of
this Court's opinion in Friberg, that in the Just Compensation
phase of the case the valuation dates should be established as
of June 22, 1977.
This Court's Opinion has concluded that the singular and
dispositive issue on appeal was not the rapacious conduct of
UDOT in freezing and sterilizing the market of appellees'
properties, but rather was the action of the landowners and
their counsel in withdrawing the monies tendered by UDOT in
consideration of obtaining physical possession, pendente lite,
of the condemned properties. Focusing on the language of the
immediate occupancy statute, Section 78-34-9, which provides
that
"[a] payment to a defendant as aforesaid
shall be held to be an abandonment by
such defendant of all defenses excepting
his claim for greater compensation ...,"
the Court Opinion concludes, without rationale, that the
valuation date for determining compensation was a "defense" to
the action under the statute, and therefor, that the withdrawal of funds by appellees was an abandonment or waiver of the
right to have damages in the Just Compensation phase assessed
4

as of the date in 1977 when UDOT's conduct froze the market
for the lands ultimately condemned 9 to 10 years later. Slip
Op. at 3.
1.

The Meaning of "Defenses" in Section 78-34-9.

A

reading of Section 78-34-9 in its setting and context as part
of the Utah Eminent Domain Code is instructive, for the
statute is housed in a Code section directly following the
very specific "defenses" which are indigenous to a landowner's
resistance to or denial of the condemnor's attempted condemnation acquisition.

In chromatic scale, those "defenses" are

laid out in black letter language immediately preceding
Section 78-34-9, e.g., failure of the condemnor to show that
the proposed use is a public use and authorized by law2, or
failure to show that public necessity exists for the proposed
taking3, or failure to show that the construction of the
proposed public work will not take place within a reasonable
time4, or that the project is not located consistent with the
greatest public good and the least private injury5, or that
the condemnation complaint is otherwise infirm.6

Indeed, in

the statutory context, the Just Compensation and damage
elements of eminent domain are not even mentioned, much less
addressed, until Section 78-34-10, et. seq.
2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4(1).

3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4(2).

4

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4(3).

5

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-5.

6

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-6.
5

Thus, it is that the only "defenses" to which Section 7834-9 refers, in the context of waiver, are those c

anses

which would prevent or deny a "taking" by the government.
This statutory list of "defenses" does not include a challenge
to the date of valuation and we submit there is no rational
basis in law or in the eminent domain process for the judiciary to create a "defense" out of a challenge to the date of
valuation.
The right to Just Compensation is a constitutional
guarantee of Article I Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
It is of paramount importance that the eminent domain process
be construed so as to insure that no landowner is deprived of
Just Compensation.
(Utah 1990).

Provo City Corp. v. UDOT, 795 P.2d 1120

The Court Opinion's catalogue of the valuation

date issue as a "defense" under 78-34-9 places the constitutional guarantee of Article I Section 22 in serious jeopardy.
2.

The Policy of Section 78-34-9.

The policy behind

the occupancy statute, Section 78-34-9, also demonstrates that
the "defenses" that are waived by a withdrawal of the deposited monies refer only to those defenses which would deny the
condemnation taking itself. This is not some sort of windfall
or philanthropic statute that merely confers an economic
benefit upon the landowner.

Indeed, the primary thrust of

Section 78-34-9 is for the condemning agency's benefit —

it

enables the government to force the landowner off and to
obtain immediate physical possession of the condemned premises
for the proposed public use upon motion within five days of
6

the filing and service of the condemnation complaint.
Code Ann. § 78-34-9.

Utah

In most instances, the motion is heard

and granted far in advance of the filing of an answer by the
landowner, much less framing the issues for trial, including
the "defenses1* against or in denial of the "taking".
The statutory policy of enabling the condemning agency to
obtain quick but

full occupancy of the premises at the

inception of a condemnation case is an exceptional benefit and
aid to the condemning agency and in the public interest of
proceeding with the public project.

The only quid pro quo of

that benefit is the requirement that the government agency
deposit with the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to 75% of
the agency's preliminary estimate of the condemned property's
value.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9.

The statute, itself, is

emphatic that the government's deposit or the landowner's
withdrawal thereof shall not be in any way determinative of
the compensation and damages to be ultimately paid in the Just
Compensation phase of the case.7 Indeed, it is not admissible
for any purpose as evidence in that phase.
So far as the property owner is concerned, the public
policy which Section 78-34-9 guards against is the possibility
that the landowner might withdraw and utilize the immediate
occupancy funds in one breath, and in the next argue that the
government agency is not entitled to condemn the property

7

The fourth sentence of the Section reads: "The amount thus fixed shall
be for the purposes of the motion only, and shall not be admissible in evidence on
final hearing." Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (emphasis added). The "final hearing"
referred to is the Just Compensation phase.
7

because of the existence of one or more of the statutory
H

defensesH enumerated in Sections 78-34-4, 5, and 6, Were the

waiver

provision

not

extant,

intemperate

action

of

the

landowner potentially could make an hypocrisy of the eminent
domain process• The policy of the waiver provision in Section
78-34-9 insures that such an irony does not occur.
Since the government's quick and physical possession
under an occupancy order does not constitute a "taking" or a
finding thereof in the constitutional sense8, and because the
preliminary deposited funds incident to the quick occupancy is
not binding against the government in the Just Compensation
phase of the case, the government, as well as the landowner,
is able to argue a valuation date other than the date of
service of summons in the Just Compensation phase of the case.
Both parties are entitled to discover and develop facts
relating to the valuation date in the subsequent evidentiary
damage phase.

Friberg, 687 P.2d at 831, 832.9

8

The view has been expressed (and not without some polemic force) that
an order of immediate11occupancy should not be interlocutory in character and should
resolve any "defenses to the condemnation taking. See Friberg, 687 P.2d at 840
(Hall, CJ., in dissent.). The fact is, however, that the Utah Legislature has provided
otherwise in the Eminent Domain Code and this Court has consistently held that a
"defense" to the taking is subject to a bench trial subsequent to or independent of
the prima facie case to be made out by the condemning agency in a Section 78-34-9
motion for immediate occupancy. Friberg, supra, at 833; Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial
Dist. Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739, 742 (1973); State Road Comm. v.
Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Co., 8 Utah 2d 236, 332 P.2d 926, 927 (1958); State
Road Comm. v. Danielson, 122 Utah 220, 247 P.2d 900, 901-02 (1952).
9

The orders of immediate occupancy entered herein did not purport to limit
any issues as to Just Compensation, but provided that UDOT could "continue in
possession * * pending further hearing and trial on issues that may be raised in this
action.* *" (Emphasis added.) See Appellant's Br., Ex. R.
8

POINT II.
IN UTAH STATE ROAD COMM. V. FRIBERG, THIS COURT
TREATED THE ISSUE OF THE VALUATION DATE AS
AN EVIDENTIARY QUESTION TO BE RAISED IN THE
JUST COMPENSATION PHASE OF THE CASE.
The Court Opinion notes at page 3 of the Slip Op., that
this Court in Friberg declared that 78-34-11 establishes an
evidentiary presumption of the date of service of summons as
the value date for determining Just Compensation. To overcome
the presumption, the evidence must not be "insignificant".
Friberg, supra at 831.

It may be overcome and rebutted by

either the condemning agency or the landowner and the evidentiary "burden of proof" is on the party urging a date other
than that of service of summons.

Friberg at 832.

Clearly, Friberg did not treat the question of the date
of valuation as a "defense" to the condemnation "taking".
While the Court Opinion notes that the landowner in Friberg
did not draw down on the condemnation deposit made by the
State under 78-34-9, it is also to be noted that the State
never took physical possession and occupancy of the Friberg
property for 7 years, even though the order of occupancy was
initially entered.
1.

The Date of Valuation is Not an Affirmative Defense.

The Court Opinion states that in order for the landowner to
preserve the right to challenge the date of valuation, some
"affirmative action" must be taken. UDOT argues in its brief
that, indeed, not only is affirmative action necessary, but
that the appellee-landowners herein were required to pled the
issue as an affirmative defense to the taking. That argument

9

1; misconceived.
successful,

An affirmative defense is one that, if

results

in

the dismissal

of

the

condemning

agency's complaint and as such, it is required to be plead
specifically under Rule 8(c) U.R.Civ.P.

Yet if the date of

valuation issue is, in law, one of the "affirmative defenses"
to a "taking" under 78-34-9, it must be pled in response to a
motion for immediate occupancy even though no pleading by way
of an answer is yet due.
This sort of procedural quagmire merely adds force to the
argument that the issue of the valuation date is an evidentiary question which is ripe for adjudication in the Just
Compensation phase of the case by either party under a motion
in limine or at pretrial hearing.

It was thus regarded in

Friberg.
POINT III.
IN CONCLUDING THAT WITHDRAWAL OF THE
OCCUPANCY DEPOSIT BY THE APPELLEES WAS
A WAIVER, THE COURT OPINION APPEARS TO
DEPART FROM ESTABLISHED WAIVER PRECEDENT.
In American Savings and Loan Assoc, v. Blomquist, 21 U.2d
289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968) this Court quoted with approval from an
earlier decision in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah
187, 194, 61 P.2d 308 (1936), as to the elements of waiver:
"* * A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute a waiver, there must be an existing
right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge
of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it.
It must be distinctly
made, although it may be express or implied. H

10

American Savings has been cited with approval recently in
Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1988) wherein Judge
Billings writing for the Court of Appeals held:
"* * The parties actions or conduct must
evince unequivocally an intent to waive,
or must be inconsistent with any other
intent, [citing American Savings] Whether a right has been waived is generally a
question of fact and therefore we accord
considerable deference to the finder of
factf s determination."
750 P.2d at 1230.
There is no evidence in the record of this case that the
appellee-landowners

"knowinglyH

and

"intentionally relin-

quished" or unequivocally waived the right to argue a different valuation date. Prior to the Court Opinion herein, there
was no case law or statute in this jurisdiction or otherwise
which even came close to suggesting that a drawdown by the
landowner of an immediate occupancy deposit of a condemnor
would, ipso facto, axiomatically result in the waiver of the
right to raise the valuation question in determining Just
Compensation. No case law suggested that 78-34-9 would be so
construed. Where a constitutional right is at stake, a waiver
should not be presumed. State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah
1980).
The Court Opinion finding such is at variance with the
waiver precedent of this Court.
POINT IV.
IF ALLOWED TO STAND, THE COURT OPINION
CREATES A HARSH AND UNJUST PARADOX FOR
A PROPERTY OWNER AND LAWYERS.

11

The Court Opinion suggests several ways that a property
owner could preserve the right to raise the date of valuation
in determining Just Compensation, viz., . . (i) the landowner
could choose not to withdraw the immediate occupancy funds
tendered by the condemnor, (ii) obtain a stipulation from the
condemnor or (iii) obtain a court order preserving an objection to the date of valuation.
Candidly, the suggested proposals are unworkable. As to
(i), the monies are a trade-off for the immediate loss of
possession of the property (often income producing and subject
to debt payments). In all probability, the landowner may have
retained legal counsel only a matter of days before or after
the occupancy order and deposit.

None of the evidence has

been assembled or developed on market value or the appropriate
value date.

What element of justice is served by requiring

the landowner to forego the withdrawal of immediate occupancy
funds, which if not taken down, will not earn any interest or
return?

Does the Court Opinion intend that the landowner be

forced to gamble at the very inception of the case on an issue
that is, to tell the truth, inextricably involved only in the
Just Compensation determination?
As to Court Opinion alternatives (ii) and (iii), UDOT or
any other condemnor has little incentive and is unlikely to
stipulate to preserving a right in a landowner, that this
Court has declared a "defense" under 78-34-9, or that may
substantially impact Just Compensation. The trial court could
discretionarily deny a request particularly in light of the
12

Court Opinion.

When all is said, the fact is that under the

Court Opinion, in order for the landowner to "reasonably"
preserve this very simple but critical right the immediate
occupancy funds cannot be touched.

The condemnor thus would

get immediate possession and the landowner, who has no
intention whatsoever of raising a "defense" against the
"taking" is deprived of that money which the Legislature has
plainly said should be paid.

Such is a harsh and unjust

result.
And what of the landowner's lawyer?
retainment,

immediately

confronted

Counsel is, upon

with the disagreeable

paradox of attempting to preserve a right to urge a different
valuation date without any basis of then known and supported
facts (a potential violation of Rule 11, see Hudson v. Moore
Business Forms, Inc., 827 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1987)), or risk
recommending to the client that the funds be left on deposit
as a result of the Court Opinion herein.

The latter choice

may subject the lawyer to claims by the client for having
failed to immediately analyze the valuation date question.
Moreover, it may prove a trap for the lawyer who reads 78-34-9
without also simultaneously scanning the Court Opinion.
C O N C L U S I O N
The structural flow of the Eminent Domain Code evidences
the legislative intent that the "defenses" under 78-34-9 which
are waived

and abandoned

by a landowner withdrawing

an

immediate occupancy deposit are those which deny, oppose, or
obstruct the attempted "taking" by the condemning agency. Any
13

argument on the date of valuation is inexorably tied to the
Just Compensation phase and does not impact upon or deny the
"taking". Under the precedent of Friberg/ the date of taking
is like many other issues in the damage phase of the trial,
viz., an evidentiary question of which the burden of proof
rests with the party (condemnor or landowner) urging other
than the presumptive date of service of summons.
This Court should grant a rehearing in this case, and on
reconsideration, the November 20, 1990 Opinion should be set
aside with the District Court's determination on the date of
valuation affirmed, it is
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL7
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 537-5555
(Associated on Rehearing)
KEN CHAMBERLAIN
TEX R. OLSEN
225 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 100
Richfield, Utah 84701
(801) 896-4461
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
Dated:

January 7, 1991
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Juatice:

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) brings
this interlocutory appeal from an order of the trial court
in condemnation proceedings where appellees* properties were
condemned for highway construction. The trial court changed
the statutory date of valuation of the properly and the date
from which interest should accrue on that value* We reverse.
Appellees each owned property on the west side of
Richfield that UDOT needed to construct Interstate Highway
70, UDOT followed the proper procedures in condemning tho
properties by serving each appellee with a summons,
tendering into court approved appraisals for each piece of
property/ and securing uncontested orders of occupancy. All
of these actions occurred between August 1986 and October
3 987. The landowners were served with process on August 19,
1986, and October 7, 12, and 15, 1987. l Each of the
landowners withdrew the tendered amount of money without
raising any objections to the taking, or reserving any
issues related to the taking, including the date of
valuation.
Under Utah law, the date of valuation is presumed
to be the date of service of summons. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-34-11* Interest is computed on a compensation award
•from the date of taking actual possession . . . or the
order of occupancy, whichever is earlier." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-34-9* After withdrawing the appraisal funds, each
landowner filed a motion to have the trial court fix dates
different from those specified under the statute for the
date of valuation and the date from which interest should
accrue. Appellees claimed that valuation at the time the
summonses were served did not lead to -just compensation"
under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution*
Although the cases have not been consolidated for trial,
they were consolidated for a hearing on appellees9 motions.
After a hearing on the motions/ the trial judge ordered that
each of the dates of valuation for the properties should be
changed from the various 1986-87 dates (the dates summonses
were served) to June 22, 1977.2 UDOT appeals from this
order.
1. These dates are presumed to be the dates of valuation. As
discussed in more detail below, Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11
provides that the date of service of process "shall be deemed"
to be the date of valuation.
2. The majority of the parties' briefs discuss which of these
dates was the
oer one for valuation. Because we decide
this case on a
ooedural point, we do not address these
arguments*
Mo. 890173
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unOT argues that appellees waived their right to
challenge the valuation dates. As noted above, UDOT
tendered to the court the full amounts of its approved
appraisals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 *s a
condition precedent to occupying the properties. These
amounts were withdrawn by each appellee, UDOT claim* that
by withdrawing these funds, appellees abandoned their right
to challenge the valuation dates. We agree. Section
78-34-9 provides in part:
Upon the application of the parties in
interest, the court shall order the money
deposited in the court be paid forthwith
for or on account of the just compensation
to be awarded in the proceeding. A
payment to a defendant as aforesaid shall
be held to be an abandonment by such
defendant of all defenses excepting his
claim for greater compensation.
The statute expresses the long-recognized common law concept
that a landowner who accepts compensation awarded for lands
taken for public use waives all other remedies* except a
claim for greater compensation or damages* United states v.
Lynfth, 188 U.S. 445, 462 (1903); Winslow v. Baltimore £. Ohio
R.R,, 208 U.S. 59, 63 (1906); Conawav v. Yolo Water L Power
&L,, 204 Cal. 125, 266 P. 944, 946-47 (1928); 27 Am. Jur. 2d
Eminent P o m In § 494 (1966).
This court specifically recognised this concept and
its embodiment in section 78-34-9 in Redevelopment Agency **
Salt Lake Clfcv v. Tanner. 740 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1987): "[The]
language (of section 78-34-9J correctly states the
established and applicable rule that once a property owner
chooses to withdraw the money deposited by the State in
obtaining the order [of immediate occupancy], he waives all
objections and defenses to the action. , . . except any
claim to greater compensation." JUL. at 1300 (emphasis
added); flee alSQ Utah State Ed. Comm'n v. rrlhrg. 687 P. 2d
821, 833 n.10 (Utah 1984). Me hold that appellees waived
their right to challenge the dates of valuation when they
withdrew the funds depoeited by UDOT without taking some
affirmative action to preserve their challenge.
In C£ll2t£g# this court, in a plurality opinion,
held that section 78-34-11 of the Utah Code "creates a
rebuttable presumption that the date for determining
valuation shall be the date of service of process." 687
P.2d at 831. The court established a high standard for
rebutting the presumption and explained the policy reasons
for doing so:
Neither the constitutional right of the
landowner or the right of the State to
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fairness would find root in firmer ground
if the statutory language were construed
so loosely as to permit the service of
summon5 to be regularly challenged on the
basis of appraisals that, at moat, might
result in minor differences in the
valuation. On the contrary, the
constitutional right and the interests it
protects, both directly and indirectly,
are accorded greater protection by a
gubatanMflfr <*«9^ee of certainty, which
will reduce the gggt p* ljfci?»fcion and

promote the expeditions disposition of
condemnstIon suite, thereby allowing the
condemnee to adjust with as little
disruption as possible to the impact of
the condemnation.
IdL st 831*32 (emphasis added).
Those same policy considerations support our
holding in this case* The legislature has mandated
procedures for exercising the powers of eminent domain.
These procedures are meant to provide the •substantial
degree of certainty* discussed in Friberg. Among these are
the steps outlined in section 78*34-9/ i.e., serving
summons, depositing funds, and securing an order of
immediate occupancy. Once the condemnor has followed these
steps and the property owner has withdrawn the funds
tendered to the court, the condemnor may assume that tho
property owner has assented to the fundamental legitimacy of
the taking. The property owner may still dispute the amount
of compensation after withdrawing the appraisal funds, but
he is estopped from disputing any other aspect of the
taking. One such aspect is the date BB of which the
property must be valued for compensation purposes.
Appellees have argued that the date of valuation is
exclusively related to the question of compensation and may
therefore be disputed after withdrawal of the appraisal
funds. He do not agree. Although the date of valuation
affects the amount of compensation, it is more closely
related conceptually to the defenses mentioned in section
78-34-9. Therefore, after the property owner has withdrawn
the funds, the condemnor is entitled to a degree of
certeinty regarding the taking, including the date upon
which compensation must be assessed. This is the policy
behind section 78-34-11, which deems the date of valuation
to be the date of service of summons, we adhered to that
poller of providing certainty in eminent domain proceedings
when we construed section 78-34*11 in ElihULSLIn £jdUbft£a,
the property owners withdrew the deposited funds pursuant to
a stipulation which explicitly reserved for trial the issue
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of the date of valuation- Our holding in this case—that a
property owner's objection to the presumption that the date
of service of summons is the proper date of valuation must
be raised before withdrawal of appraisal funds—further
promotes certainty and efficiency in eminent domain
proceedings.
This does not mean that a property owner, if faced
with a situation where the date of service of process would
be an unfair valuation date, is unable to dispute the date.
In fact, there are a number of possible ways to object to
the presumption that the date of service of process is the
proper date of valuation. A property owner could choose not
to withdraw the funds tendered by the condemnor. This would
clearly preserve an objection to the date of valuation- A
property owner might accept the appraisal funds under
stipulation that he or she is preserving an objection to the
date of valuation, as was done by the appellants in
Friberg. 687 p.2d at 827. Absent a stipulation, a property
owner could seek approval from the court for withdrawal of
the appraisal funds after giving notice of the objection to
the date* That approval should be granted by the trial
court upon a prima facie showing that applying the
presumption of valuation as of the date of service of
summons may be unconstitutional,fiftfiFrlbero, 687 P.2d at
830-31. Since the property owners in this instance withdrew
the funds without reserving any objection by stipulation or
otherwise, they waived the right to challenge the date of
valuation.
The trial court ruled that interest should be
computed from the June 1977 date rather than the date the
immediate order of occupancy was granted. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-34-9. The basis for this ruling was the court's
resolution of the valuation date claim, which claim we now
hold waived by the appellees. We therefore also reverse
this part of the trial court's order.
Because we reverse the trial court's order on
procedural grounds, we do not address the other arguments
raised.

WE CONCUR;
Gordon R* Hall, Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
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